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A  Multistage  Model  of 
B  argaining 
JOEL SOBEL 
and 
ICHIRO  TAKAHASHI 
University of California, San Diego 
This paper presents  a simple,  multistage model  of  bargaining wherein a seller makes an 
offer that can be either accepted or refused.  If rejected, the process continues.  How the seller's 
ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commit- 
ment  equilibria  to  those  arising when  commitment  is  impossible.  The  effects  of  increasing 
uncertainty about preferences  and varying the  length of  the  bargaining horizon are analysed. 
The ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper considers  a simple,  asymmetric model  of  bilateral monopoly  (bargaining) 
under uncertainty in which a single seller, with one  object to sell, faces a single buyer. 
The seller announces a price for the object, which the buyer can either accept or reject. 
If the offer is accepted, then the object is transferred at the announced price; otherwise, 
the process continues with the seller announcing another price.  Waiting is assumed to 
be  costly to  both  buyer and seller.  The  one-period  (stage) version  of  this model  has 
been analysed by W. Samuelson (1980);  Chatterjee and W. Samuelson (1981)  consider 
the one-stage  bilateral monopoly problem where both players make offers and a sale is 
made, at a compromise price, if the buyer offers at least as much as the seller. 
Two aspects of the bilateral monopoly problem are of particular interest to us.  First, 
if the seller has incomplete information about the buyer's willingness to pay, then there 
may be situations in which the buyer and seller fail to  make a transaction at the first 
price even  though gains from trade are available. Thus incomplete  information about 
preferences may cause bargaining impasses.  Impasses can take the form of costly delays 
before agreement is reached, or of an ex post inefficiency, the complete failure to make 
a beneficial transaction. If the seller realizes that there are unexploited opportunities for 
trade after the first offer is rejected, it is reasonable to assume that the bargaining process 
should continue; that is, bargaining should proceed in stages until all potential benefits 
are exhausted  (in our model this takes the form of a sale being made or the discovery 
that no mutually beneficial sale is possible). 
Once we assume that the bargaining takes place in stages, the second issue arises. 
What is the appropriate equilibrium concept? In principle, which bargainer makes offers 
should be determined endogenously.  The assumption that only the seller makes offers 
allows us to draw conclusions about the sensitivity of outcomes  to bargaining costs and 
the number of periods that are true in more general settings.  One possibility is to look 
for strategies that maximize the expected  profits of the seller assuming that the buyer, 
taking prices as given, buys in the period that maximizes his discounted surplus. We call 
these commitment equilibria; in such an equilibrium, the seller must be able to guarantee 
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that the price schedule  he originally announces will not be  modified in the future. In 
general,  such a position  is not credible since  optimal commitment  strategies  are time 
inconsistent: the seller will want to change his pricing policy after his first offer is rejected 
and he learns more about the buyer's willingness to pay. Alternatively,  if commitment 
is not possible, the no-commitment  equilibria are appropriate. Essentially, these consist 
of pricing plans that are optimal from each period forward conditional on the information 
the seller has learned by the buyer's previous refusal to make a purchase. 
In this paper, the  effects  that the  choice  of  equilibrium concept  and uncertainty 
about preferences have on bargaining outcomes  are analysed. Of particular interest are 
how outcomes  change when bargaining costs, the number of periods, or the amount of 
uncertainty varies. An  understanding of these  effects might make it possible to design 
bargaining environments that lessen inefficiencies. 
The  results  of  the  paper  are  as  follows.  Section  3  gives  a  characterization  of 
equilibria  in  the  two-stage  game,  examples  to  show  that  there  are  no  general 
comparative-statics  results  for  the  no-commitment  equilibria,  and  a  theorem  that 
suggests  that  bargaining  outcomes  can  be  improved  by  controlling  the  length  and 
timing of the bargaining periods.1 
Section  4  considers  an analytically tractable class of  examples.  This class is rich 
enough to yield intuitively appealing sensitivity results as well as to suggest the conditions 
on which these results depend. 
In addition to the papers of Samuelson (1980) and Chatterjee and Samuelson (1981), 
which show that uncertainty about preferences is a cause of bargaining inefficiency, other 
models that explain bargaining impasses have been proposed. General results that explain 
the failure to reach efficient outcomes in games with incomplete information have been 
given by Myerson (1979)  and Rosenthal  (1978).  Crawford (1982)  presents a model  in 
which  impasses  are  the  result  of  bargainers  commiting  themselves  to  incompatible 
positions.  In Crawford (1982),  a bargainer makes a demand in the first period, then he 
learns his own cost of backing down, but not that of his opponent.  In the second,  and 
final, period the bargainer decides whether to back down from his demand based on his 
cost and the other bargainer's demand. Not backing down leads to an inefficient outcome 
if the other bargainer refuses to back down from an incompatible position, but leads to 
a high payoff if the other bargainer backs down. The ability to make successful commit- 
ments is determined endogenously  in Crawford's model.  Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) 
completely  characterize the no-commitment  equilibria in a two-stage  bargaining model 
virtually identical to ours.  Except for an example, they restrict attention to reservation- 
price distributions for both  bargainers that have  two-point  supports.  Fudenberg  and 
Tirole's (1983) results will be contrasted with ours throughout the paper.  Using a similar 
model,  Crampton (1982)  analyses a two-stage  bargaining model with two-sided  uncer- 
tainty and in which there is a continuum of potential buyer and seller reservation prices. 
Several other papers deal with sequential bargaining or bargaining with incomplete 
information.  Rubinstein  (1982),  Binmore  (1980),  and  McLennan  (1981),  in  related 
papers, consider bargaining processes  that are in principle sequential.  However,  they 
assume complete  information and, except  for exceptional  cases, bargaining terminates 
after a single period. In these models the relative cost of waiting determines bargaining 
strength.  Riley and Zeckhauser (1980)  consider a bargaining model in which the seller 
is allowed to commit himself and there are no costs associated with delaying agreement. 
They  find that in general,  a single take-it-or-leave-it  price generates  higher expected 
profit than making concessions over time.  This result appears in our model as well (see 
Theorem 1). Finally, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) consider procedures that maxim- 
ize the sum of buyer and seller surplus in a bilateral monopoly  model similar to ours. 
These procedures are usually ex post inefficient so that they can only be sustained if the 
bargainers can commit themselves to discontinue negotiations if they fail at first to reach 
an agreement; explicit bargaining costs are not present. SOBEL  &  TAKAHASHI  MULTISTAGE  BARGAINING  413 
2.  THE  MODEL 
There is a single buyer characterized by a reservation price v and a discount factor q. 
There is a single seller characterized by a known reservation price taken, without further 
loss of generality, to be 0 and a discount factor p. The costs of bargaining are represented 
by p  and q; we assume 0<p,  q < 1.  Both  discount factors are common  knowledge;  v 
is known only to the buyer. A probability distribution F(v),  which is common knowledge, 
represents the belief that the seller has about the buyer's reservation price.  F(v)  is the 
probability that the buyer has a reservation price less than or equal to  v. We  assume 
that F(  ) is supported  on  [0, 1] and, for most of  the paper, that the density function 
f(v)  3F'(v)  is continuous and strictly positive for v E [0, 1]. 
Bargaining has the following structure.  The seller sets a price and offers the buyer 
an opportunity to purchase the object.  The buyer then either waits or agrees to make 
the purchase at the given price.  If the buyer refuses the offer then the process repeats, 
with the seller making a new offer in the next period.  In Section 3 we assume that only 
two offers can be made; in Section 4 we assume that the process continues indefinitely. 
We distinguish between  two types of equilibria.  The simplest is the commitment 
equilibria. 
Definition.  A  commitment  equilibrium  for  the  n-stage  bargaining  game  is  a 
sequence of price functions x,...,  x * that maximize the seller's expected profit assuming 
that the buyer, taking prices as given, buys in the period that maximizes his discounted 
surplus. 
Thus, x*, ...  , x*  is a commitment equilibrium if x*, ..  , x*  solve: 
maxx1..  Zxn=1p  lxi(F(Si-  )-F(Si))  (A) 
subject to 1'  Si '  Si,,  _ 0 for i = 1,...,  n -  1 where 
(1  for i=0, 
Si =  (xi-qxi+1)(1-q)-1  for i =  1, ...  , n -, 
(Xn  for i =  n. 
A  v-buyer will prefer buying in period i  to period i + 1 if v -xi  >q(v  -xi+,)  or v >Si. 
It follows  that period  i  is a v-buyer's most  preferred time  to  buy if Si-i > v >Si  and 
so  F(Si1)  -F(Si)  is  the  ex  ante  probability  of  making  a sale  in  the  ith period  and 
xi(F(Si1)  -F(Si))  is the ex ante, undiscounted expected profit in stage i. 
In a commitment equilibrium, the seller is able to stick to a particular sequence  of 
prices in spite of what he learns from the buyer's actions. 
In  a  more  general  model,  the  seller's  ability  to  make  commitments  would  be 
determined endogenously.  However,  the approach of this paper is to compare commit- 
ment equilibria to the outcomes  that arise if commitment is impossible.  This allows us 
to study how the gains from commitment vary with bargaining costs. 
Let 
7T1(S)=maxx  [x (F(S) -F(x))]F(S)-l 
be  the maximum expected  profit of  a seller  if there  is one  period remaining and the 
buyer is known to have a reservation price no greater than S. Assume that x (F(S) - F(x)) 
is maximized by a unique value of x for fixed S2; let x2(S) denote that value of x. 
Definition.3  A  no-commitment  equilibrium  for  the  two-stage  bargaining  game 
consists  of  prices xCl  and x2, a cut-off function 5(x1),  and point  expectations  E(x2|x1) 414  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
such that 
(i)  2C1  solves: max,1 x1(1  F(S(xi)))  +pi7T(S(xi))F(S(xi)) 
(ii ?=  X2(  (?1)) 
(iii)  E(x2jx)  =X2(S(Xl)), 
(iv)  S(x1) = (x1  -  qE(x2jx1))(1  -q)1,  and 
(v)  A  v-buyer accepts the first offer of x1 if and only if v  S(x1);  a v-buyer who 
refused the first offer accepts the second  offer, x2, if and only if v 'x2. 
The buyer's decision  of when to buy can be described by the S(  ) function since, 
if an S-buyer is indifferent between waiting and accepting the first offer, then a v-buyer 
strictly prefers to buy in the first period if and only if v >  S. 
The  difference  between  a no-commitment  equilibrium and a commitment  equili- 
brium is the added restriction that the seller's second-period  price maximizes expected 
profit conditional on what he learns from the buyer's refusal to make a purchase in the 
first period.  Unless  the seller is able to prevent himself from doing so  (by committing 
himself to  another course of  action), it is natural to require that he sets conditionally 
optimal second-period  prices. 
The no-commitment equilibria involve a phenomenon not present in the commitment 
equilibria, but present in real bargaining situations: information transmission.  In order 
to formulate strategies, both the buyer and the seller must correctly use the information 
that their opponent's  previous actions convey.  Thus, the seller uses a failure to accept 
an offer as an indication that the buyer's reservation price is below  a certain value; the 
buyer uses  the  first offer of  the  seller  to  make  a prediction  about future prices,  and 
decide whether to wait or to accept the first offer. 
Informally, a no-commitment equilibrium has this form.  The buyer forms a conjec- 
ture about the relationship between  the first offer and the seller's second offer.  Acting 
on this conjecture, he can predict the expected  value of the second offer given the first 
offer, E(x21x1),  and thus decide whether to wait.  Conditions (iv) and (v) guarantee that 
the buyer is purchasing in the correct period given his expectations.  The seller, taking 
the buyer's behaviour as given and taking into account that his second offer is constrained 
to be conditionally optimal given the buyer's refusal in the first period (ii), decides which 
first offer to make  (i).  Finally, we require that the buyer's expectations  are fulfilled in 
equilibrium (iii). 
In  Section  4  we  analyse  no-commitment  equilibria  for  the  n-stage  game.  The 
definition given above can be extended to this case.  Formally, let 
7rk(S)  =rmaxc,s  [x(F(S)  -F(Tkl(x;  S))) +p7k1(Tk_1(X;  S))F(Tk-l(x;  S))IF(S)Y 
where 
,ro(S)  0  O,  To(x; S) = min [x, S], 
and for k > 0, 
Tk(x; 5)  {JT  where T - (x -qrk(T))(1  -q)'  if such a T  E [0, S] exists, 
T  S 
S  otherwise 
and rk (S)  is the value (it will be unique for our applications) of x that maximizes 
x(F(S)-F(Tk_1(x;  S)))+PTrk_1(Tk_1(X;  S))F(Tk-,(x;  S)) 
subject to x '  S.  Thus, when there are k periods remaining and the buyer is known to 
have a reservation price no greater than S, lrk  (S) is the maximum expected profit assuming 
that the seller will behave optimally in the future; rk(S)  is the price charged in order to 
attain 'Tk  (S) and Tk-(x;  S) is the reservation price that makes the buyer indifferent between 
waiting and accepting the offer x.  For the examples of Section 4, rk()  will be increasing 
and  rk  (x)  ? x,  so  that  Tk()  is well-defined  and  Tk (x;  S)  x.  Therefore,  Ik()  and  rk() 
can be defined inductively; the no-commitment equilibrium prices for the n-stage bargain- 
ing game are the prices charged in order to attain im  (1). SOBEL  &  TAKAHASHI  MULTISTAGE  BARGAINING  415 
3.  TWO  STAGES 
In this section we examine the two-stage bargaining game. 
First, we characterize the commitment equilibria. 
Theorem 1.  If p cq,  then there is a commitment equilibrium (x*, x *) with x*  -  x2* 
If p >  q, then all commitment equilibria involve x  > x * 
Proof.  The seller's problem (A) is equivalent to finding an S* and an x2  to solve: 
maxS,X2  ((1  -  q)S + qx2)(1  -F(S))  +Px2(F(S)  -F(x2))  (B) 
subject to 
1  S  S_X2  O  ? 
If (S*, x*)  solves (B), then x* = (1 -q)S*  +qx2* and x*  solve (A). The objective function 
in (B) can be rewritten 
(1 -  q)S(1 -F(S))  + qx2(1 -F(x2))  + (p - q)x2(F(S) -F(x2)).  (1) 
When  p cq  and  S -x2  the  third term  in  (1)  is  non-positive.  Therefore  the  entire 
expression  is maximized  when  S =  X=  ,  where  x  is a solution  to:  max. x (1 -F(x)), 
since in this case  all three of the terms in the sum (1) are maximized.  If p > q, (1) is 
either increasing in S or decreasing in x2 whenever S =  x2. Since the maximum is certainly 
not  achieved  for boundary values  (S =  1 or  X2 =  0),  the  solution  must involve  S >x2. 
These  arguments establish the theorem because x*  is a convex combination of S*  and 
x  .  11 
When p -  q, Theorem  1 enables  us to  give  the  concept  of  commitment  a clear, 
operational meaning.  The seller maximizes his expected profits by announcing a take-it- 
or-leave-it  price.  If the buyer is at least as patient as the seller, the benefits of charging 
a price low enough to make additional sales in the second period are outweighed by the 
losses that result when the buyer delays his purchase to take advantage of a lower second 
price.  It should be emphasized that this strategy would not generally be an equilibrium 
without the  possibility of commitment: if the optimal commitment policy is announced 
and the first offer is rejected, the seller will have an incentive to lower his price in order 
to make a sale to a low-v  buyer.  The commitment equilibrium is only viable if the buyer 
is convinced that the seller will not deviate from his announced strategy. 
That the optimal commitment strategy involves restricting sales to a single period 
when p =  q has been  noted, in more general settings, by Stokey  (1979),  in the context 
of intertemporal price discrimination, and by Riley and Zeckhauser (1980) in a bargaining 
model.  Fudenberg and Tirole  (1983)  noted  that the single-price  result does  not hold 
when p > q. 
We now examine the sensitivity of commitment equilibria to changes in parameters; 
since  the  single-price  equilibrium obtains  when  p cq,  we  restrict attention  to  p >  q. 
Increases in the bargaining horizon from one to two periods strictly increase the expected 
profits of  the seller  since  the one-period  strategy is still feasible,  but is not  adopted; 
decreases in q are beneficial to the seller because the same prices generate higher expected 
profit.  Straightforward computations show that S*(.)  is decreasing in q and increasing 
in p when pq-'  is close to one.  The effect of changes in p and q on x*(  ) and x2*( ) is 
ambiguous.  If p = q  an increase in p  reduces x4*  as does  a decrease  in q.  However, 
if  pq-l  is  large  then  the  prices  respond  to  changes  in  the  bargaining  costs  in  the 
same  way  as S*(.).  The  expected  surplus to  the  buyer,  given  prices x1 and x2,  and 416  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
S  (x1-qx2)(1-q)1,  is 
1  gS 
(v - x )F'(v)dv + q J  (v -X2)F'(v)dv.  (2) 
S  ~~~~~~~X2 
Substituting (1 - q)S + qx2  for x1 in (2) yields 
1  r1 
B(S,  X2)--(1  -  q  )  (v - S)F'(v )dv + q  (v  - X2)F'(v  )dv.  (3) 
S  ~~~~~~X2 
In  a  commitment  equilibrium,  B*(p,  q)=B(S*(p,  q), x*(p,  q))  is  decreasing  in  p 
whenever S*()  and x2 ()  are increasing in p since B ()  is decreasing in S and x2. That 
increases in p  and in the number of periods can actually benefit the buyer is shown in 
the example  following  Theorem  2.  The example  also shows that the first price in the 
two-stage commitment equilibrium may be higher or lower than the one-stage  price. 
The characterization of the commitment equilibria given above does not depend on 
bargaining being limited to two stages; the optimal selling strategy involves restricting 
sales to  the first period if and only if p  - q  regardless of  the number of periods.  We 
have restricted attention to the two-stage model because it is only in this case that general 
analysis of no-commitment equilibria is possible for us. 
To analyse the no-commitment equilibria, we assume that the function G (x)  xF(x) 
is twice  continuously  differentiable  and that  G"(-)>0.  This is a decreasing expected 
marginal revenue assumption, and guarantees that the problem 
maxxx(F(S)-F(x))  (C) 
has a unique solution,  x2(S),  for each S.  x2(S)  is defined implicitly by the first-order 
condition for (C), 
G'(X  2(S))  F  -  (S). 
It  follows  that  x2(')  is  strictly  increasing  and  S >x2(S)  >0.  If  Xr(S) 
x2(S)(F(S)  -F(x2(S)))F(S)-1  is the maximum expected  single-period  profit given that 
v-'  S, then a no-commitment equilibrium is characterized by a first-period price, 21, that 
solves: 
maxx  x (1-  F (S (x))) +prr(S  (x))F (S (x))  (D) 
subject to 
S(W)  S  where S =  (x -qx2(S))(1  -q)-l  if such an SE [0, 1] exists, 
1  otherwise. 
Using the constraint to eliminate x in the objective function of (D), the problem can be 
transformed into: 
maxo?-s i (1 -q)S(1-  F(S)) +qx2(S)(1  - F(S))  +pir(S)F(S).  (E) 
If S solves (E), then x  =  (1 -q)S  + qx2(S)  and X2 =  x2(S) are no-commitment equilibrium 
prices, and a v-buyer accepts the first offer if and only if v -'S.  The partial derivative 
with respect to S of the objective function in (E) is 
H(S, p, q)  (1 -q)(1  -  G'(S)) + (p -  q)x2(S)f  (S)  + qx  (S)(1 - F(S)).  (4) 
Since 0 <p,  q < 1, 
H(O,  p, q)= l -q  +qx'(0)  >  0>-(1  -q  -  (p  -q)X  2(1MY(1)=  =H(l,p,  q), 
the objective function in (E) attains a maximum for some S(p, q) E (0, 1) and 
HT(S(p,rq),ep,  q)  2.  .  (5) 
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Theorem  2.  For fixed p and q, the no-commitment equilibria are characterized by 
a  triple (x1(p,  q),  X2(p,  q), S(p, q))  such  that S(p, q)  solves  (E), X2(p,  q) = x2((p,  q)), 
x1(p, q) = (1 -q)S(p,  q) +qi2(p,  q),  and  a  v-buyer accepts the first offer if and  only  if 
v-'S(p,  q). Furthermore 1 >S(p, q)>x1(p,  q)>x2(p,  q)>0. 
Proof.  Only the relationship  S(  )>x  1(  ) >  '2(  )>0  remains to be verified, but 
this follows since S >X2(S)  implies S(  )>x2(  ) and &C(Q)  is a convex combination  of 
S(.)  and&x2(  ).  II 
Therefore,  in no-commitment  equilibria,  prices  fall, sales are made in both periods 
with positive  probability,  and there is a positive  probability  that no sale will be made. 
Also, since  H(S, p, q) is increasing  in p, the equilibrium  prices  will be nondecreasing 
in  p, and  will be strictly  increasing  whenever  the second-order  condition  for (E) is satisfied 
strictly;  if the seller becomes more patient  then the buyer  is made worse off. 
No general statements can be made about how the no-commitment  equilibrium 
prices  change  when  q changes,  although  decreases  in q are  beneficial  to the seller  because 
a decrease  in q allows the seller to induce a given probability  of a first-period  sale with 
a higher  first-period  price. Another  way to see this is to note that the objective  function 
in (E) is decreasing  in q. 
It is difficult  to make comparisons  between the two types of equilibria. The seller 
prefers  to be able to commit himself, of course, since the no-commitment  equilibrium 
prices are feasible commitment strategies. For fixed S, the second price in a no- 
commitment  equilibrium  is lower than what the seller would charge if commitment  is 
possible. This is because, with commitment,  the seller can threaten  to maintain  a high 
price in order to induce first-period  purchases. In the no-commitment  equilibria,  this 
threat  is not credible. The next example  is presented  to show the difficulties  of making 
a comparison  and, in general, of carrying  out sensitivity  analysis. For tractability,  we 
assume  that the distribution  of buyer  reservation  prices  is discrete. 
Example.  The buyer's  reservation  price, v, is equally likely to take on the values 
1, 4+a, and a, where a  is a small, positive number. The seller's reservation  price is 
known  to be zero. The equilibria  for this example  are described  in Table I. Depending 
on the parameters,  one of three strategies  is an equilibrium:  (H, M), where first-period 
sales are made only if v = 1 (high), and second-period  sales are made only if v = 2 + a 
(middle);  (M), where first-period  sales are made if v = 1 or 4  + a, and no sales are made 
in the second period;  and (M,  L) where first-period  sales are made if v = 1 or 2+  a, and 
if v = a  (low) then a purchase  is made in the second period. Strategy (M) is feasible 
only if the seller can commit  himself. 
Given any p0 and q0  >0  it is possible to find an a >0  such that (H, M)  is the 
no-commitment  equilibrium  for all (p, q) _ (p?, qo). Since the buyer  must wait until the 
second period  for the price  2 + a, (H,  M) is strictly  worse for him than the single-period 
equilibrium.  Also, for p -q,  the seller strictly  prefers  his one-period profits  to what he 
expects  to make  in the no-commitment  equilibrium  (this  follows  from  Table  I or Theorem 
1). Here increasing  the number  of periods  is bad for both bargainers  since, in order to 
avoid charging  a low price in the second period, the seller can only sell to a 1-buyer  in 
the first  period. This can only happen  when the reservation  price of the buyer takes on 
more than two values; Fudenberg  and Tirole (1983) show that one of the bargainers 
prefers  two periods  to one when the buyer's  reservation  price takes on only two values. 
For the commitment  equilibrium,  the example shows that increasing  the length of 
the bargaining  process can either increase  (if (H, M) is optimal)  or decrease (if (M,  L) 
is optimal)  the first  price. An increase  in p can make the buyer better off (by reducing 
both prices) if it causes the strategy  (M,  L) to be optimal instead of (M).  Increases  in 418  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
TABLE  I 
First  Second  Surplus  Surplus 
Equilibrium  Strategy  price  price  Expected profit  if v =1  if v =  +a 
Single-period  (M)  2+a  (1+ 2a)13  2-a  0 
No commitment 
if q +2qa  +p >4a  (H, M)  1 -q(4-a)  ?+a  (l-q(  -a)+p(l  +a))/3  q(2-a)  0 
if q +2qa  +p _4a  (M, L)  +?a  -q/2  a  (2a +pa  + 1 -q)/3  -a  +q/2  q/2 
Commitment 
if 2pa-q+2qa+  (H,M)  1-q(  -a)  '+a  (1-q(  -a)+p(?+a))13  q(  -a)  0 
p>4a 
if 2pa -q  + 2qa +  (M, L)  + a - q/2  a  (2a +pa  + 1 -q)/3  -a  +q/2  q/2 
p_5  4a 
and pa > q 
if 2pa-q+2qa+  (M)  4+a  1+a  (1+2a)/3  2-a  0 
p _4a 
and pa '  q 
Note.  An a-buyer never gets positive surplus. 
q make (M, L) less attractive to the seller; this hurts the buyer because the alternative 
strategies are (H, M)  and (M).  The first price may be either higher or lower than the 
one-period  price. 
For the no-commitment  equilibrium, it is also true that increases in the number of 
periods may either increase or decrease the first price.  Furthermore, increases in q may 
be unfavourable to the buyer by increasing both prices. 
To  compare the  equilibria, note  that (H, M)  can be  the optimal no-commitment 
equilibrium while  (Af) is optimal when commitment  is possible.  Thus the inability to 
make commitments may increase prices and thus reduce the buyer's surplus. 
The example shows that in general, simply lengthening the bargaining process need 
not be beneficial to either bargainer.  Theorem  3 presents  a result that suggests, with 
appropriate controls on the environment, the one-shot  result can be improved upon. 
Our measure of bargaining efficiency is expected  total surplus, T(*),  the expected 
profits plus the expected surplus of the buyer.  We restrict attention to the case p = q so 
that second-period  payoffs are comparable.  When p = q, total surplus can be written 
T(S,  X2)  pV (X2)  +  (1 - p)  V(S),  (6) 
where 
V(x)  x (1 -F(x))  +  (v -x)F'(v)dv  (7) 
is the expected total surplus if the single take-it-or-leave-it  price x is charged; (6) follows 
from (1), (3), and the definition of  V(  ), (7).  In this context,  the way to maximize the 
expected surplus is to give the object to the buyer, possibily requiring a lump-sum transfer 
from  buyer  to  seller  as  well.  This  procedure  guarantees  ex  post  efficiency  and  no 
bargaining costs are incurred.  However,  it is not a feasible  procedure if the seller has 
the right to set his sale price for then he would charge a positive  price.  The only way 
to guarantee ex post efficiency and a positive  payoff to the seller would be to require 
the buyer to make a payment for the item independent  of his reservation price.  But if 
the buyer cannot be forced to make a lump-sum payment in excess of his valuation, it 
would not be possible to implement this procedure. 
If attention is restricted to procedures that guarantee to the seller a certain profit 
level, a single take-it-or-leave-it  price maximizes the buyer's surplus when p = q.  To see SOBEL  &  TAKAHASHI  MULTISTAGE  BARGAINING  419 
this, use (1) and (3) to write the problem as: 
1 
max1s?2?x,0 (1 -p)  J  (v -S)F'(v)dv  +p j  (v -S)F'(v)dv  (F) 
subject to 
(1 -p)S(l  -F(S))  +px2(1 -F(x2))  'K. 
Then, for some A-  0, problem (F) is equivalent to: 
max 1?-s  x21  (1 -p)(V(S)  - (1  -A)S(1  -F(S)))  +p(  V(x2)  - (1  - Ak)x2(1 -F(x2))),  (G) 
and, because the objective function is additively separable in S and x2, (G) has a solution 
that satisfies S =  X2.  This is equivalent  to setting a single price, x.4  The problem with 
this procedure is that it is ex post inefficient and, unless future bargaining is prohibited 
or the seller can commit himself, the buyer will expect  prices to fall in the future, and 
will refuse to purchase if his reservation price is slightly greater than x.  However,  if the 
bargaining is restricted to one period or commitment is possible, then the seller will set 
the price x that maximizes x(1 -F(x)). 
Is it possible to increase total surplus beyond  V(x)  if the seller can set prices, but 
commitment is not possible? According to the next result, the answer is yes. 
Theorem 3.  If G"(  *  ) is continuous and strictly  positive, then the expected total surplus 
in a no-commitment equilibrium  is maximized for p strictly  between zero and one. 
Remark  1.  If a third party (arbitrator) can control  the  length  of  time  between 
bargaining periods,  or the  number of  offers, bargaining costs  can be  controlled.  For 
example, the arbitrator can announce the probability of letting the bargainers meet again 
if they fail to reach an agreement in the first period.  In this case, p should be interpreted 
as the probability that the bargaining process will continue.  Equivalently, he can vary 
the length of time between  offers, shortening it if p  near one  is desired, lengthening it 
if smaller p is optimal. 
Remark  2.  In  the  proof  of  Theorem  3,  the  notation  S(p)-S(p,p),  X2(P)- 
x2(p,  p), and T(p)  T(S(p),  xC2(p))  is used.  Also,  W(1) 3limp,1-  W(p) for all functions 
Proof.  Since  H(S, p, p) = (1 -p)(l  -  G'(S)) +px2  (S)(1 -F(S)),  it  follows  that 
H(S,  1, 1) > 0 for all S <  1. Thus, because H(  ) is continuous, H(S, p, p) = 0 has a unique 
solution for p near one, hence S is characterized by (5). It follows that 
S(1)=  1.  (8) 
Therefore, 
x 2 (1) = x2 (1)S(1)=  1.  (9) 
The first equality follows because ?2(p) -x2(S(p))  and the second equality follows from 
(8) and an application of the implicit function theorem to (4).  To prove the theorem, it 
suffices to show that T'(1) <0.  This condition  is sufficient because  (8) implies that no 
sales  are made  in the  first period when p = 1, and so  T(1) = V(xi), the  single-period 
total expected surplus. 
From  (6),  T(p)  -pV(x2(p))+(1  -p)V(S(p)).  Therefore,  since  V(1) =0  and, 
because x^2(1)  maximizes x(1 -F(x)), 
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it follows that 
T'(1) =  V(x2())  +  V(x2(1)) 
1 
= X2(1)(1 -F(xC2(1)))  + 1 -  x2(1)  F(v)dv  -(1  -F(x2(1)))  <0, 
:C2(1  ) 
where the first equality uses (9); the second equality uses (10) and an equivalent version 
of  V(  ) obtained by integration by parts; and the inequality follows  since J F(v)dv  > 
F(x)(1-x)forx<1.  11 
The proof of Theorem  3 shows that total surplus is not maximized when p = q = 1. 
Increases in p in the neighbourhood of p = 1 have two effects on total surplus: a direct 
effect, which increases surplus by reducing bargaining costs, and an indirect effect, which 
decreases surplus by increasing x2.  At p = 1, the direct effect is 
1 
X2(1)(1  -F(X2(1)))  +  x2(1))F (v)dv, 
the total surplus, and is bounded above by 1 -Fx2(1)),  which would be the total surplus 
if xC2(1)  were  the price and all buyer types who purchased valued the object  at v = 1. 
The indirect effect comes  only through the reduction in the buyer's expected  surplus; 
this contribution is -(1  -F(x2(1)))  X  (1).  Therefore, total surplus will not be maximized 
at p = 1 when 
A,  (1) > 1. This is not true in the example given earlier, as the second price 
is constant near p = 1 and, in fact, the conclusion of the theorem does not hold for the 
example.  However,  X 2(1)=1  whenever  G"( )>0  because  then xC2(  ) is characterized 
by  (5) for  p  near  1.  When  p = q,  increasing S  has  two  effects  on  profit: it  reduces 
first-period profit by causing the probability of a sale to decrease (the magnitude of this 
effect  is  (1 -p)Sf(S)),  and it increases  profit by allowing x1 to  increase  (this effect  is 
[(1-p)+px'(S)](1-F(S))-  the  change  in x1 multiplied by the  probability of  a first- 
period sale).  Since S(1) = 1, at p = 1 f(1)  is the rate of change with respect to p of the 
first  effect. The analogous  quantity  for the second effect is -XA,  (1)f(l).  Since these two 
effects must cancel out at the optimum, f,  (1) =  1. 
Since,  when p = q = 0,  the  bargaining is essentially  restricted to  one  period  and, 
when p = q = 1, it is always possible for the seller to restrict sales to the second period 
by charging a high price in the first period, it follows from Theorem 1 that T(0) = T(1) = 
&k(1-F(x-))+J  (v-x-)F'(v)dv,  where  x  solves:  maxx(1-F(x)).  Theorem  3  asserts 
only that T(p)>  AO) for some  0<p  <1.  It would be of interest to know when  T(p) 
is actually minimized at p = 0 or  1.  This is the case if F(v)  =  vtm,  m > 0,  but we have 
been  unable to find more genpral conditions.  In fact,  T'(0) >0  if and only if  j (0)<0 
(since changes in p near zero have only a second-order effect on profit and the buyer's 
expected  surplus depends,  up to  first order, only  on x1), but our assumptions do  not 
imply x  1(0) <0  -and we  have been  unable to  find a meaningful  assumption that does 
guarantee that x'1  (0) <0. 
We close this section by a particularly well-behaved  example. 
Example.  Let F(v)  v for 0 '  v _  1 and assume that the seller's reservation price 
is known to  be  zero.  When  the discount factor of  both  bargainers is equal  to p, the 
no-commitment  equilibrium values are: 
=  (p  = (2  p)2  (4 -  3p)  1/2 
X2(P)  =(2  -p)(4  -  3p)1/2 
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* (p) = Expected Profits = (2 _p)2(4  -  3pF)1/4 
B(p)=  Expected Buyer Surplus =  (4-  3p2)(4 -  3p)1/8 
T(p)  = Expected Total Surplus =  (12-  8p -p2)(4  -  3p)-1/8 
The  commitment  equilibrium values  can  be  obtained  from  the  no-commitment 
quantities with p = 0 or 1.  The take-it-or-leave-it  price is^2,  seller's expected profit is 4, 
and the buyer's expected  surplus is  8.  In this example,  T'(p),  S'(p),  and -*'(p)  have 
the  same  sign for  all p:  buyer surplus is perfectly  correlated  with total  surplus, and 
negatively  correlated with expected  profit.  T(')  is maximized  when p =23,  and mini- 
mized when p = 0 or 1.  We can compare the total surplus generated by the mechanisms 
discussed in this section: 
total surplus at single take-it-or-leave-it  price (x =  -8 
total surplus maximizing no-commitment equilibrium (p =3  =18 
total surplus at single price that yields expected  profit equal to surplus maximizing 
no-commitment  equilibrium (x =3  =9 
total available surplus (x =0)  =2 
Thus, total surplus can be increased from the single take-it-or-leave-it  price if the 
bargainers are informed that negotiations will continue with probability 2 if they fail to 
reach an agreement  with the  first offer.  However,  this procedure  is dominated  by a 
single  price  of 4, which guarantees  the  seller  the  same  profit as the  no-commitment 
equilibrium with p =  2,  but increases  the  buyer's expected  surplus since  no  costs  are 
incurred.  Finally, total surplus is maximized if the  price is set  at zero.  The  last two 
procedures are not feasible if the seller has the right to set prices. 
4.  INFINITE  HORIZON 
Thus far we have assumed that bargaining ends after two periods.  It would be more 
realistic to assume that in each period there is another price offered by the seller and a 
response  by the buyer.  As  is apparent from Section  3, there is no guarantee that the 
concavity of  a single-period  profit function will be inherited in a multi-period  model. 
Consequently,  the dynamic programming techniques  used to construct an equilibrium 
do not apply.5  However,  existence  results are available for models  that are similar to 
ours.  In particular, Goldman's (1980)  proof of existence  of intertemporally consistent 
plans can be  modified to  guarantee  existence  in our model  for  any finite number of 
bargaining periods. However, there appears to be no simple, general method to guarantee 
uniqueness, and doing comparative statics would be difficult. On the other hand, a class 
of distribution functions lend themselves to analysis. 
We shall consider the class of distribution functions for the buyer's reservation price 
v  of  the  form F(v,  m)  v  m  for  m > 0  and 0 _ v -  1. The  seller's  reservation price is 
assumed to be 0.  This class is simple enough to yield analytically tractable results, yet 
rich enough to allow for comparisons.  For each m the mean of F(.,  m) is m (m + 1)1 
but  increases  in  m  make  the  distribution  of  reservation  prices  less  spread-out  and 
therefore correspond in a natural way to decreases in the seller's uncertainty about the 
buyer's reservation price.6  Thus, after correcting for the difference in means,  we  are 
able to analyse how increasing uncertainty affects bargaining outcomes. 
We  begin  by  analysing  commitment  equilibria.  That  is,  we  look  for  prices  xi, 
i=  1, 2, . . . that maximize the seller's expected  profits assuming that the buyer, taking 
prices as given, buys in the period that maximizes his discounted surplus. 422  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
Theorem 5.  The seller's optimal commitment strategy is of the form 
x*'(p,q,m)=(c*(p,q,m))'-'x*  (p,q,m)  fori=1,2,... 
where  x*(p, q, m) = (m  +  l)-1  ,c  c*(p, q, m) = lforp  ? q and, when  p >q,  c*(*) is defined 
implicitly by 
p(1  -qc*)(1  -(c*))  )-m(1  -pc*)(p(c*)m  -q) 
and 
x  (m +  1)-1/m(1  -q)(1  -qc*)-[(l-  p(c*)m?)(1  - pc)] 
Expected profit, r*(r),  is given by 
irj*(p, q, m) = x(p,  q, m)m(m + 
Proof.  For p 'q,  the argument of Theorem  1 can be extended  to show that the 
seller will restrict sales to a single period, and charge x (m)  (m +  1)7/m  the expected 
profit maximizing single-period price.  All other prices should be greater than or equal 
to x(m)  in order to restrict sales to the first period.  Without loss of generality, we may 
take x* (p, q, m) =x  (m) for i >1. 
For p > q, the seller's maximization problem is to find X1, X2,...  to solve: 
max .Z71 p'1x(F(Si-1,  m)-F(Si,  m))  (H) 
subject to 
= (xi-qxi+1)(l  -q)1  if i ? 1, 
ii-l1  if i =0 
and 
Si_1:-Si-'0  fori=1,2,.... 
The first-order conditions for (H)  are: 
O=F(So,  m)-F(S1,  m)-f(S1,  m)(x1-px2)(1-q)1 
and 
0 =p(F(Si-1,  m) -F(Si,  m)) +qf(Si-,,  m)(xi-  -pxi)(1  -q)1 
-pf(Si,  m)(xi -pxi+1)(1 -q)1  for i = 2, 3,.... 
Here  f(v, m)-aF(v,  m)/av.  These  conditions  determine  a difference  equation.  The 
values for x * (*) in the statement of the theorem solve the difference equation and, since 
0_c*()  1, the constraints of (H) are satisfied.  It can be checked that x* (),  x 2 (*),..a 
satisfy the sufficient conditions for maximization of (H).  The formula for 7r*(.)  is easily 
derived given x(*)  and c*(*). 
When  p > q, increases  in q  lower  the  expected  profits of  the  seller  because  any 
strictly decreasing price schedule becomes less profitable when the buyer becomes more 
patient; a tedious computation shows that increases in p lower the expected  surplus of 
the buyer, but need  not make all buyer types worse off: the prices may fall faster if p 
increases,  increasing  the  surplus of  low-v  buyers.  Another  computation  shows  that 
increases in m increase prices, so that the buyer prefers low to high values of m.  This 
can be explained because the mean of F(  ) increases with m.  Thus there is more reason 
to charge a high price as m increases.  We have been unable to determine the effect that 
increases in m have on the expected surplus of the buyer when a correction for changes 
in mean  is made;  ir*(p, q, m)m-1(m  + 1), the  expected  profit relative  to  the  mean of 
F(,  im),  increases  with  m,  so  mean-preserving  spreads  in  the  distribution  of  buyer 
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Next we characterize the no-commitment equilibria. Let 4n, (S, p, q, m) be the expec- 
ted profit  when n periods  remain  and the buyer  is known  to have a reservation  price no 
greater  than S, and let An  (S,  p, q, m) be the price charged  in the first of the remaining 
periods. For notational  convenience,  we suppress  functional  dependence on p, q, and 
m; no confusion  should  arise. 
Theorem  6.  For fixed p, q, and  m, the no-commitment equilibrium of the n-stage 
bargaining game has expected profit, *n(S),  and price (with n periods remaining), rn(A), 
given by 
r'n(S)  =  'nS 
rn (S)=  m(m +  CnS 
where 
=  (m +  1)l/m  and, for m > 1, 
Cn=  (1  -q  +  qCn-1)[(1  -q  + qcn-1)((m + 1)(1-q  +  qCn  MpCn_1)  - 
Proof.  The proof is by induction  on n. When one period  remains,  we solve: 
max,x[S  -x']S-' 
so that 
ri(S) = (m + 1)Y1/S  and  i*1(S) = m(m + 1-(m  + 
In general, 
7n  (S)  max.  (x(Sm -  T )+pn_1(T)Tm)S"',  (12) 
where 
T-x  =q(T  _  rn-1(T)). 
In order  to complete  the proof by induction,  assume  that 
n1=(T)=  m (m +1) 1y  _lT  and  rnP.(T)  = CnT.  (13) 
Substituting  the constraint  into the objective function of (12), and using the induction 
hypothesis,  (13), it is possible  to rewrite  (12) as 
rn  (S)maXT[(1-q  +qCn41)T(Sm  -Tm)+pm(m  + 1)Cn-1T  m+]S  n.  (14) 
The unique  maximum  is attained  when 
((m + 1)(1-q  + qCn  )-mpCn1)  T  = (1 -q  + qCn 1)Sm, 
so 
T  =  [(1  -q  +qCn-1)((m  +  1)(1  q +qcn1)  MpCn_1) 
Using (13) and (14), we obtain Pn(S)  CnS  and 7rn(S)=M(M  CA completing  the 
proof.  11 
Several sensitivity  results can be derived from Theorem 6: decreases in p lowers 
prices,  therefore  the buyer  benefits;  decreases  in q benefit  the seller;  increases  in m lead 
to higher  prices, making  the buyer  worse off; also, increases  in m increase  the expected 
profits  of the seller  relative  to the mean. These  facts  can  be derived  from  straightforward, 
but tedious, computations. 
Increases  in the number  of bargaining  periods also has a definite  effect. It follows 
from  Theorem  6  that  An(-)  is proportional  to cn(4  Moreover,  the  sequence  {4} is 424  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
monotonic.  If p  is much bigger than q, then the sequence  increases, thus a relatively 
patient seller prefers a longer bargaining horizon.  In this case, the effect on the buyer 
is ambiguous: if v is high, then the buyer faces higher prices in the time periods relevant 
to him, but increasing the number of periods increases the probability that the buyer 
will obtain positive surplus. 
The  expected  surplus for the  n-stage,  no-commitment  equilibrium when  v ?  S  is 
given by Bn  (S) =  knS, where, setting 
h  (c) =  [(1 - q + qc)((m + 1)(1 -q  + qc) -  mpc)-Y]/m, 
k = m (m +  i)F'  -  C,  +C  m+1  (m  + 1)i 
and 
ki+  = m (m + 1i)F(1 -  h ci  )+  (  1 - q  cE)  -  h(c )) 
+qkih(ci)mhc  for i>1. 
The sequence  {kn} increases whenever  {Cn} is decreasing, as is to be expected  since in 
this case surplus increases for each  v.  In general lkn}  need  not be  monotonic.  It can 
be  shown  that kn_ > kn  implies  that kn  >  kn+,, but it may happen  that the  sequence 
{kt} increases and then falls.  This occurs when p is large relative to q (but not so large 
that {kn} decreases  monotonically).  An  increase in n  has two effects: it increases the 
price  charged  to  all  buyer  types  who  buy  before  the  last  period  and  increases  the 
probability of sales.  The first effect becomes larger relative to the second when n increases 
as sales are made with higher probability in that case, and the potential surplus available 
by increasing the probability of  a sale is small.  Except  for the rare case when  {I'}  is 
constant (this requires that p and q satisfy 
(m + 1)(i - q + qc`') - mpc  1  =  (m  +  )(1 -+  qC 1) 
where C',  = (m + 1)-1/m), {cA4I  is strictly decreasing for all other values of p and q, so that 
increasing the number of periods benefits the buyer and hurts the seller. 
In order to  compare the  two  solution  concepts,  we  take  the  limit of  the  n-stage 
no-commitment  equilibria.7 Since  the  sequence  Cn, )  is  monotonic  in  n  and  hence 
converges to a limit, c(*),  the next result follows immediately from Theorem 6. 
Corollary.  The no-commitment equilibria of the infinite horizon model are charac - 
terized  by  prices  xCi(p,  q, m) =  C(p, q, m)(d^(p,  q, m)),  where d = c  -q+qc  and 
c(  ) is defined implicitly by 
c  1  -q  +qcq)[(1-  +qc)((m  +  )(1  -q  +qc  )  - 
Expected profits, v'(p, q, m), are equal to m(m +  )-Fc'(p, q, m). 
Thus, the general form of the prices for the two types of equilibrium is identical in 
that  the  ratio  of  successive  periods'  prices is  independent  of  the  period.  A  routine 
computation shows that x(i  )<x  ) for all i, so that the ability to make commitments 
leads to strictly higher prices in this class of examples.  Since 0<  c()  <  1, limo  Xi(-) = 
0,  so that bargaining outcomes  in the  no-commitment  equilibria are efficient ex post; 
this will be the case for commitment equilibria as well if and only if p >  q. 
For the no-commitment  equilibrium, when p = q, it can be shown that total surplus 
and the  expected  surplus of  the  buyer  increase  with  equal  increases  in the  discount 
factors, and that all of the possible surplus is obtained  (and goes to the buyer) when p 
and q approach one.  Thus, as bargaining costs go to zero in the infinite horizon model, 
the seller loses the ability to make sales at positive prices. 
The examples discussed in this section are extremely well-behaved.  The reason for 
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a uniform  rescaling,  for any cut-off value. When an offer is refused, the seller learns 
something  about the buyer's  reservation  price (that  it is below a certain  value), but that 
does not change  the form  of his pricing  strategy. This  amounts  to a stationarity  restriction 
that makes  the infinite  horizon  dynamic  programming  problem  tractable. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The simple  model of this paper  was presented  in an attempt  to capture  several  important 
elements of bargaining:  the effects of uncertainty;  the sequential  nature;  the possibility 
of impasses; the sensitivity to bargaining  costs; the manner in which information  is 
transferred;  and the dependence on whether or not commitment  is possible. To the 
extent that the model is an accurate  representation  of bargaining  situations  the results 
seem to indicate  that  detailed  statements  about  the effects  that changes  in the parameters 
have on outcomes cannot be made without additional  assumptions,  although  there is a 
presumption  that control  of the timing  and number  of offers  can improve  results. 
In particular,  we found that the ability  to make commitments  was beneficial  to the 
seller, but little else could be said in general. Lengthening  the bargaining  horizon  could 
hurt both players, although the bargaining  environment  can be modified to increase 
expected surplus. Making  one bargainer  more impatient  need not improve  the welfare 
of the other if commitment  is not possible  as it may make attractive  strategies  infeasible. 
Only for the well-behaved  examples of Section 5 could definite conclusions  be made. 
Here intuition  was generally  correct:  increasing  uncertainty  hurt  the seller  and  bargainers 
typically  preferred  to bargain  against  an opponent  with high costs of waiting. 
Two limitations of  the model are worth mentioning. Although comparison of 
expected payoffs  in commitment  equilibria  to those in no-commitment  equilibria  gives 
a measure of the incentives the seller has to attempt commitment,  it would be more 
satisfying  if the ability to make commitments  were derived endogenously. It may be 
possible to do this by deriving  the costs of making commitments  and carrying  out an 
analysis along the lines of  Crawford (1982).  For example, commitment  should be 
relatively  likely (less costly)  when the difference  between the profit  expected  from using 
conditionally  optimal  prices  and  commitment  prices  is relatively  small  in all  future  periods. 
Another  problem  is the structure  of bargaining  we assumed. Ideally,  both the buyer 
and  the seller  should  be allowed  to make  offers  with  asymmetries  in their  roles  determined 
endogenously. Some of our results are sensitive to the assumption  that the seller only 
makes  offers. In particular,  the assumption  restricts  the way in which  the seller can learn 
about the buyer. 
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NOTES 
1.  An earlier version of this paper treated the case in which the seller's reservation price was unknown. 
The  analysis follows that of Milgrom and Roberts  (1982)  and the results are similar to those  of Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1983),  which contains a detailed discussion of this case. 
2.  This assumption will be  made  throughout  the  paper.  However,  the  definition  of  no-commitment 
equilibria can be extended to the case in which the maximum of x(F(S)-F(x))  is attained at more than one 
point. 426  REVIEW  OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
3.  The  equilibrium  concept  is  a  refinement  of  Harsanyi's  (1967)-(1968)  notion  of  Bayesian  Nash 
equilibrium along  the  lines  of  Selten's  (1975)  concept  of  subgame  perfection.  However,  the  game  has no 
proper subgames; the seller can make inferences about the buyer's reservation price on the basis of a refusal 
to make a purchase, but he cannot assign a prior distribution to  v at a particular stage of the game without 
reference to previous actions.  The inclusion of a specification of beliefs along with strategies in the definition 
of equilibrium is due to Kreps and Wilson (1982). 
4.  Arguments of Maskin and Riley (1980) or Riley and Zeckhauser (1980) can be used to derive a more 
general version of this result.  We are grateful to a referee for clarifying our ideas on this point. 
5.  This observation, in the context of dynamic consistency, was first made by Peleg and Yaari (1973). 
6.  We refer to the Rothschild-Stizlitz  (1970) definition of risk. Each member of the family of distributions 
F(v,  m)  [(m + 1)m  i]-"nvm  on 0<  v _ (m + 1)m -l  has mean one, and risk decreases as m increases. 
7.  Fudenberg and Levine  (1981)  give conditions under which the limit of  --perfect  equilibria for finite 
horizon games is a perfect equilibrium for an infinite horizon game.  Fudenberg (1981)  indicates that these 
results generalize to the solution concept of this paper. This implies that the limit of our finite horizon equilibria 
is a no-commitment  equilibrium of the infinite horizon game. 
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